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Abstract—In this work we investigate a new approach for detecting attacks which aim to degrade the network’s Quality of
Service (QoS). To this end, a new network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) is proposed. Most contemporary NIDSs take
a passive approach by solely monitoring the network’s production traffic. This paper explores a complementary approach in which
distributed agents actively send out periodic probes. The probes are continuously monitored to detect anomalous behavior of the
network. The proposed approach takes away much of the variability of the network’s production traffic that makes it so difficult
to classify. This enables the NIDS to detect more subtle attacks which would not be detected using the passive approach alone.
Furthermore, the active probing approach allows the NIDS to be effectively trained using only examples of the network’s normal
states, hence enabling an effective detection of zero-day attacks. Using realistic experiments, we show that an NIDS which also
leverages the active approach is considerably more effective in detecting attacks which aim to degrade the network’s QoS when
compared to an NIDS which relies solely on the passive approach. Lastly, we show that the false positives rate remains very low
even in the face of Byzantine faults.
Index Terms—Anomaly-Based Network Intrusion Detection System, Active Probing, One-Class Learning, Ensemble Learning
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are key
in the security architecture of many organizations. A
typical NIDS inspects traffic flowing into, out of, or
inside the target network while attempting to isolate
a malicious activity. Broadly speaking, an NIDS tries
to identify two types of malicious activities. The first
type includes attacks carried over network traffic that
target end nodes. One such example is a worm that
aims to infect and take control over end nodes. An-
other example is a reconnaissance activity that scans
active IP addresses or opens ports at some end nodes.
The second type of attack targets the network itself.
Attacks of this type include exhaustion of a link’s
bandwidth by overwhelming it with traffic as well
as unauthorized modification of a network’s routing
process. The ultimate goal of such attacks is to de-
grade the QoS provided by the network to its users.
Traditionally, NIDSs are broadly classified based on
the style of detection they use. Some systems rely
on a precise description of the malicious activity, i.e.,
knowledge-based (signature-based) detection. Other
systems rely on statistical modeling of the network’s
normal state and regard significant deviations from
this state as attacks, i.e., anomaly-based detection.
The current paper addresses the problem of detect-
ing QoS degrading attacks which target the network
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itself, and further focuses on attack classes which have
not yet been seen before, i.e., zero-day attacks. In
order detect new attacks classes, an IDS should not
rely on the description of known attacks (e.g., DNS
poisoning or OSPF attacks), their specific features
(e.g., increased number of failed TCP connections) or
even on monitoring known attacks surfaces (e.g., DNS
cache or routing table), since a new attack class might
exploit the vulnerabilities of previously unexplored
attack surfaces, which might have significantly dif-
ferent features from those of previous attacks. Con-
sequently, the knowledge-based IDS approach is not
suitable for the task at hand. Hence, in the rest of
the paper we focus on the anomaly-based detection
approach.
Most anomaly-based NIDS take a passive approach.
They rely exclusively on monitoring the network’s
production traffic and extracting the relevant features
that indicate the progression of an attack. However,
experience has shown that the immense variability
of network traffic is a major stumbling block of the
NIDS [1]. Such variability is demonstrated in many
of the network’s traffic features and consequently
makes them very difficult to predict over short time
scales (seconds to hours) and furthermore presents
difficulties in detecting anomalies generated by the
network attacks. In addition, a passive NIDS needs to
process all the production traffic flowing through it. It
has been shown that anomaly-based NIDS are unable
to run at line rate in the network core [2]. In order
to mitigate this problem, an NIDS may be deployed
closer to the network edge where its visibility of the
entire network traffic is reduced. Alternatively, packet
flow sampling may be used, however, that can further
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2degrade the detection accuracy [3].
Our work takes a somewhat different approach
and aims to complement the pitfalls of the passive
approach. We propose to produce artificial probing
traffic exchanged between various agents over the
network. General QoS features are then extracted from
the probing traffic, rather than from the production
traffic. Lastly, anomalies are identified based on those
features. The rationale of this approach is as follows.
First, the probing traffic is much more predictable
than the production traffic and therefore an abrupt
change in one of the features gleaned from that traffic
is most likely sourced at an anomaly of the network
rather than a legitimate shift of traffic. This approach
takes away much of the variability of network traffic
which makes it so difficult to predict. Secondly, the
probing traffic is treated by the network as regular
production traffic and therefore probing traffic will
be affected by network attacks as much as the pro-
duction traffic is. Thus, the detection potential is not
diminished.
Note that a fundamental property to this approach
is that it detects anomalies produced by the attack
effects on the network, such as changes in traffic
delays or packet losses. This allows us to detect
any attack, including zero-day attacks, as long as it
affects the network’s QoS parameters. In particular,
we do not attempt to monitor the by-products effects
of specific types of attacks, such as the increased
number of failed TCP connections, increased traffic
volume, shifts in port or IP distribution or changes
to routing tables and DNS caches. This will allow us
to identify a wide range of attacks which target the
network, regardless of their nature or the techniques
they employ. Examples of such attacks include but are
not limited to: 1) subversion of the routing process in
the network; 2) poisoning of basic network services,
such as the DNS; and 3) overloading of the network’s
links or routers. Overall, our NIDS architecture aims
to detect every attack that has some adverse effect on
the service provided to users by the network.
Another key feature of our work is the use of
one-class learning. Our NIDS is trained only on a
normal network state. This means that network attack
records and specifications are not required, further
creating substantial operational benefits. The key as-
sumption of this strategy is that it is possible to
obtain a complete picture of almost all normal states
in the network and thereby reliably infer that any
other state is anomalous. This assumption is known
as the Closed World assumption [4]. In general, the
assumption is believed to be impractical for most
real-life problems since it is impossible to cover all
normal states. Nonetheless, our work focuses on the
network’s effects and the QoS it provides to its users.
This QoS is generally regarded as stable and pre-
dictable to the extent that many network operators
have commercial obligations to it under service level
agreements (SLAs). Therefore, our working assump-
tion is that we can cover all normal network states
with a high degree of confidence. Furthermore, it has
been shown [5] that a deviation of network perfor-
mance for operational purposes can be successfully
detected using anomaly detection techniques.
1.1 Applicability
The NIDS architecture proposed in this work aims to
identify and locate attacks that have an adverse effect
on the network and service provided to its users. That
is, our aim is not to find attacks on the network’s end
hosts that do not affect the network itself, such as
the silent spread of a worm in the network, a slow
port scan or a buffer-overflow that affects only the
victim end host. Therefore, it is important to note that
we do not aim to propose an alternative to existing
detection approaches, but rather to complement them
where they are less effective.
Our assumption is that the attacker’s goal is to do
one of the following: (a) inhibit or reduce the service
provided by the network to its users (e.g., DoS attacks)
or (b) modify services provided by the network (e.g.,
routing process or other basic services such as DNS).
As mentioned above, we aim to detect all such attacks
regardless of the specific techniques they employ or
the protocol they use over the IP protocol.
Our approach may detect rare benign events that
affect the network’s QoS, such as a flash crowd, as
anomalies. However, in section 5.7, we show that by
using a simple method, our proposed NIDS can learn
to ignore such benign anomalies with a very small
cost of intrusion detection delay.
Our NIDS architecture identifies the location of the
attack’s effect, not the attack’s traffic or its source.
The rationale of this approach is based on the fact
that the detection of the true source of a real-world
attack demands elaborate forensic work conducted by
a human expert. The findings or alerts of any NIDS
are only the starting point to detecting the true source
of the attack. This is especially true in the case of the
common multi-stage attacks [6].
The proposed NIDS architecture is focused on intra-
domain network settings, such as enterprise or ISP
networks. In such a setting, the network operator
has the ability to deploy the proposed distributed
architecture. In addition, the operator has full knowl-
edge of the network topology and the routes taken
between every pair of end nodes. This knowledge is
essential in order to deploy our proposed architecture
efficiently.
1.2 One-Class Learning
One-class learning is a special case of machine learn-
ing whose main goal is to differentiate examples of the
class of interest from all other examples. The one-class
3classifier is trained from a training-set containing only
the instances of that class. In network security, one-
class classifiers most frequently train on the normal
state of the network, i.e., they model the network’s
normal state. There are two main features that make
one-class classifiers attractive for network security.
First, they do not require any labeled attack instances,
which are very difficult and costly to attain and
second, they can identify zero-day attacks, which are
often the attacker’s weapon of choice.
1.3 One-Class Ensemble Learning
One of the contributions of this work is the applica-
tion of meta learning ensemble to NIDS. The main
idea behind this ensemble methodology is to weigh
several individual classifiers (ensemble members) and
to combine them via another classifier (combiner)
to obtain a classifier that outperforms the ensemble
members. Theoretically, an ensemble can benefit from
any independent base-classifier that performs even
slightly better than a random one (see the Condorcet
Jury Theorem and [7]). Indeed, previous studies in
supervised ensemble learning (e.g., [8]) show that
combining classification models can produce a better
classifier in terms of prediction accuracy.
In contrast to the research on supervised learning,
progress in the theory of combining one-class classi-
fiers has been limited. According to [9], up until 2008,
this research field was relatively new and had not
been thoroughly explored. In particular, in the setup
of diverse ensemble members, only two combining
methods were considered for one-class problems: the
fix-rule [10], [11] and meta-learning [12] ensembles.
Meta-learning is a process of learning from ba-
sic classifiers (ensemble members); the inputs of the
meta-learner are the outputs of the ensemble-member
classifiers. The goal of meta-learning ensembles is to
train a meta-model (meta-classifier) that will com-
bine the ensemble members’ predictions into a sin-
gle prediction. In order to create such ensembles,
both the ensemble members and the meta-classifier
need to be trained. Since the meta-classifier training
requires already trained ensemble members, these
must be trained first. The ensemble members are then
used to produce outputs (classifications) from which
the meta-level dataset (meta-dataset) is created. This
dataset will be used for training the meta-classifier.
The basic building blocks of meta-learning are the
meta-features, which are measured properties of the
ensemble members, e.g., an ensemble members’ pre-
dictions. A vector of meta-features comprises a meta-
instance, i.e., meta-instance ≡< fmeta1 , ..., fmetak >.
A collection of meta-instances comprises the meta-
training-set upon which the meta-classifier is trained.
Paper Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we present related work. In Section 3, we
introduce the proposed NIDS method. We then dis-
cuss the experimental setup and the network attacks
used in the evaluation in Section 4 and present the
results in Section 5. Finally, we close with conclusions
in Section 6.
2 RELATED WORKS
In the past two decades, many anomaly-based NIDS
schemes have been proposed. The common trend
among these systems is that they model the network’s
normal state by analyzing aspects of the production
traffic, e.g., network flows [13], [14], [15], packet
payload information [16], [17], [18], network event
analysis [19], [20], [21] or management information
base (MIB) aggregated information [22], [23], [24].
By depending solely on the production traffic (or its
aggregations), of which they have no control, these
NIDS take a passive approach and should hence
be labeled “passive-NIDS.” The passive approach has
many advantages like high data availability and sim-
plicity. However, many drawbacks also exist. Sommer
et al. [1] list five attributes of the network security
domain that usually prohibit (passive) anomaly-based
NIDS from being implemented or adopted in real
networks. They argue that detecting attacks is a very
different and more difficult task than the classic task
of machine-learning. Their list of five attributes is
as follows: First, “real-life” errors bear a very high
cost in reality. Second, usually only a very limited
training data is available. Third, there is a difference
between the anomaly detector output and the opera-
tional meaning. Fourth, it is difficult to train a sound
model of the network’s normal state because of the
huge variance in the training data. Fifth, machine-
learning NIDS cannot be evaluated in conditions suffi-
ciently close to reality and therefore their benchmark
results do not reflect their eventual performance on
real networks.
In contrast to passive-NIDS, the active-NIDS ap-
proach, by which the NIDS relies on self-traffic in-
curred by probe sending, can overcome some of the
aforementioned deficiencies. A fundamental property
of the active-NIDS is that during the normal network
operation, its probe features, such as hop count and
average round trip time, are characterized by very low
variability. This means that probes’ features are very
predictable, thus can be modeled easily and effectively
by training classifiers on limited size datasets, as
we show in Section 5. While classification errors are
not easy to avoid completely, maintaining the very
costly false alarms at zero, while at the same time
detecting every significant attack, is indeed possible,
but at the cost of a detection time delay. In this study
we demonstrate such a technique and measure its
detection time delay (we refer to this as Time-to-
Detect, denoted TtD).
Byzantine faults, which might occur due to unex-
pected network failures or topology changes, should
4be detected by the NIDS if presenting a significant
change from the network’s normal state. We argue
that these benign events should be addressed by
the network operator and should not be counted
as false alarms of the NIDS. In appendix 5.7, we
demonstrate a method for reducing the detection of
benign anomalies while still preserving the detection
rate. The active-NIDS has full knowledge of the paths
its probes travel during training time; therefore, when
an anomaly occurs, it can localize the affected network
devices by identifying the probes with anomalous
features. Such a technique is given in Section 3.4.2.
The anomaly localization feature provides the security
specialist and the network operator with valuable
information. Although this does not close the gap
between anomaly detection output and operational
meaning, it is a step closer to this goal.
Up until now, the active probing approach has
been practiced mainly for network monitoring, fault
localization and network diagnosis, e.g., [25], [26],
[27]. Our survey found only two related studies. The
first, by Barbhuiya et al. [28], presents a genuine
NIDS, whereas the research by Barford et al. [5] is
actually related to network QoS assurance, though is
quite easy to translate for network-security purposes.
The active-NIDS studied by Barbhuiya et al. [28]
sends address resolution protocol (ARP) probes to
detect ARP spoofing attacks. The authors devised a
formal model of the protocol state transitions with
which they later detect anomalies. The main draw-
backs of their method are that it is protocol-specific,
namely, it is not sufficiently general to detect other
classes of attacks and it protects the hosts only in the
local network.
Barford et al. [5] also take the active probing ap-
proach but with the intentions of identifying network
QoS anomalies and localizing anomalous links. Their
ultimate goal is to detect and localize QoS anomalies
that might occur on any existing path between any
two measurement nodes. To do so, they must cover
the entire network by a probing scheme. To avoid pro-
ducing and analyzing O(N2) probes in each time unit,
they limit the monitoring task to only k selected (with
probability) paths in each time unit; since they assume
that the anomalies are persistent, they are certain to
detect them after finite time periods. Furthermore,
they perform the anomaly detection and localization
task in two stages; first an anomaly detection stage,
followed by the anomaly localization stage.
While this approach works for QoS assurance, it is
not entirely suitable for the network security domain,
since network security attacks that cause link failures
are intentional, malicious, and might be limited in
time, while in operational networks, link failures tend
to occur sporadically and are persistent.
Moreover, the two-phase detection and localization
method has been criticized [29] as producing sub-
optimal anomaly detection and localization perfor-
mance. An additional limitation of Barford et al.’s
method is that they put no bound on the length of
their probes, and by not doing so, they are usually
required to send elevated numbers of probes to local-
ize an anomalous link, in contrast to a short probing
scheme, such as the one described in the present
study.
3 THE PROPOSED METHOD
The new NIDS scheme, ACTIDS (Active Intrusion
Detection System), is mainly characterized by five
features: (1) dispatching of probe packets to generate
network traffic, from which features are extracted; (2)
hierarchical anomaly detection architecture, i.e., the
network is partitioned into smaller disjointed sub-
networks (a single autonomous anomaly classifier
(local anomaly classifier) is linked with each network
sub-network); (3) anomaly classifiers are trained on
examples of the normal network state (i.e., one-class)
so attack examples are not required during training;
(4) anomaly detection and localization are performed
simultaneously; and (5) in combining the predictions
of the local anomaly classifiers, a state-of-the-art meta-
learning ensemble is used.
3.1 Architecture
ACTIDS includes three main components: Agents,
Sensors, and a Central Detection Server (CDS). The hi-
erarchy is as follows. Each Sensor gathers information
from multiple Agents, which are the elementary parts,
and the CDS combines information from multiple
Sensors. These three components are described in
depth below.
Agent - lightweight software responsible for trans-
mitting probe packets and extracting QoS statistics
from incoming probe packets. The Agents are in-
stalled at selected hosts. The probe packets are stan-
dard IP packets which carry special protocol values
in order to be distinguished from other packets at the
network layer. Agents are linked to at least one Sensor.
Sensor - an anomaly detector overseeing a limited-
size connected network section. During the setup
phase (see 3.2), the network is partitioned into dis-
jointed sections, each of which is assigned to a single
Sensor. The Sensor, as can be seen in Figure 1, is made
up of an Instance Creator module and a machine-
learning anomaly classifier and is bound to Agents
installed at its network section. The Instance Creator
module continuously aggregates data from the bound
Agents, and once every pre-defined time period, it
produces an instance that is then classified by the
anomaly classifier. The classification or anomaly score
is a numerical value in the range of [0,1] which repre-
sents the likelihood of local anomaly and is outputted
to the CDS, where it is combined with other Sensors’
classifications.
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Fig. 1. The Sensor’s conceptual architecture
Central Detection Server (CDS) - produces the
global anomaly score, which indicates the security
condition of the entire network. The CDS plays a role
in all three states of the proposed NIDS. In the setup
phase, the CDS has two functions. First, it determines
the network partition, according to the partition algo-
rithm; each partition holds a single Sensor. The CDS’s
second function during setup is to determine the
probing scheme. During the training phase, the CDS’s
anomaly classifier is trained. Lastly, in the detection
phase, the CDS produce a global anomaly score by
combining anomaly scores produced by the Sensors.
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Fig. 2. Example of two probes, sent across two
Sensors, which then send their corresponding local
anomaly score to the CDS
ACTIDS has a three stage life cycle: setup, training,
and prediction. All the aforementioned stages are
fully automatic and require very limited user inter-
vention. We now describe each of these stages.
3.2 Setup Phase
In the setup stage two pre-processes of ACTIDS are
executed; the first determines the Sensors’ partition
while the second determines the probing scheme.
3.2.1 Local Anomaly Sensors
During the setup phase, the network is logically par-
titioned into sub-networks. A local anomaly detector
(Sensor) is attached to each sub-network. Algorithm
1 establishes a set of disjoint Sensors, each of which
contains up to max number of routers routers.
Definition 1: (Probe). Probe is a special media that is
sent between two Agents.
The Probes are used for extracting crude network
features upon which anomalies are detected. Probes
make a roundtrip, starting at the source Agent, travel-
ing to the destination Agent at one of the adjacent Sen-
sors, and then returning to the source. The roundtrip
is necessary in order to avoid router time synchro-
nization, which may be difficult to attain in real-life
networks. A Probe can be made of any type of media
which is appropriate for sending over the network,
e.g., IP packet, ICMP packet or any application packet
of choice. The source and destination hosts relate to
different Sensors.
Definition 2: (Probe-Path). Probe-Path is a set of
connected edges (v, e) which follow the shortest path
between the Probe’s source host and its destination
host and back to the source host.
Definition 3: (Probe re-sending). Let Tprs denote the
constant time interval between subsequent Probe re-
sending.
3.2.2 Probe Dispatching Mechanism
The Probing Mechanism produces a list of Probes. Later,
during the training and detection phases (the second
and third stages of the proposed NIDS’s life cycle,
respectively), this Probe list is sent to enable Agents
to measure statistics regarding the network’s QoS.
During the training and detecting stages, the Probes
are re-sent once every fixed (configurable) period of
time. A procedure for an automatic generation of a
probing scheme is presented in Algorithm 2. We call
this algorithm “the probing algorithm.” The probing
algorithm is the second and final algorithm related
to the setup phase. The inputs for this algorithm
are the Sensors’ partition, a list of routers, and the
Probe length, i.e., probesLength. The probing scheme
algorithm follows three guidelines:
1) To increase the likelihood of detecting anoma-
lies, Probe-Paths should cover as many of the
network’s edges as possible.
2) To reduce both Probe traffic and learning com-
plexity, use as few Probes as possible.
3) To enable accurate detection of the anomaly
source, Probe-Paths should be short, i.e., 4 or 6
edges.
These guidelines can be translated into an opti-
mization problem in which we aim to cover all the
network’s edges with a minimal set of Probe-Paths
over a bounded number of edges. A special case
of this problem, in which no bound on the Probe-
Paths’ length exists, has been shown to be an instance
of the NP-hard Minimum Set Cover problem [25].
However, covering all the network’s edges is very
likely to generate too much Probe traffic and increase
the learning dimensionality, thus making the learning
task too complex.
6Our probing scheme uses only on the order of
O(|v|) Probe-Paths while attempting to cover most
of the network devices. This is because each router
sends, at most, a single Probe, whose path length is
bound by the pathLength constant, as presented in
Algorithm 2.
Such a probing scheme will generate sufficient in-
formation to detect attacks whose effects reach beyond
the boundaries of a single Sensor. As the network
attack affects a greater section of the network, and is
therefore regarded as more severe from the perspec-
tive of the defender, the probability of the effect being
captured by at least one Probe increases.
Algorithm 1: Partition the network into disjointed
Sensors
Input: NetworkTopology : network’s topology
Input: max routers : the maximal number of
routers in each Sensor
Output: SensorsMap : a list of Sensors
Routers←ParseTopology(NetworkTopology)
SensorsMap← ∅
foreach r in Router do
Degree← CalculateDegree(r)
Sort(Routers) by Degree;
while |Routers| > 0 do
currentSensor ←createEmptySensor ()
kernel←deleteFirst (Routers);
Add Kernel To currentSensor
while |currentSensor| ≤ max routers do
nr ←DeleteNeighbor (kernel,Routers)
Add nr To currentSensor
Add currentSensor To SensorsMap
The DeleteNighbor(r,Routers) routine extracts the
neighbor router of k with the highest rank and deletes
it from router group Routers.
Algorithm 2: Probe-Scheme Generation
Input: RoutersMap, SensorsMap, probesLength
Output: list of Probes
pl← probesLength
ProbeList← ∅
foreach r in RouterMap do
srcS ← GetSensor (r,SensorsMap)
Candidates←RoutersAtDistance (r,pl)
foreach c in Candidates do
destS ← GetSensor (c,SensorsMap)
if Not(srcS==destS) AND
ExistProbeBetween(srcS,destS)=false then
src← r
dest← c
ProbeList+=New Probe(src,dest)
end foreach
3.3 Training Phase
In this stage all the machine-learning models, i.e.,
the local anomaly detectors attached to the Sensors
and the global anomaly classifier in the CDS, are
trained. At the end of this stage, the proposed NIDS
is ready for the detection phase. The training process
comprises three distinct tasks: producing the training
datasets, training the Sensors’ classifiers, and training
the global anomaly classifier. We now discuss each of
these tasks.
Definition 4: (Classification Time). Let Tcl denote
the constant time interval between behavior classifi-
cations of subsequent networks.
Prior to training the machine-learning-based classi-
fiers, a set of appropriate training data is produced.
This is achieved in several stages. First, the NIDS
begins sending Probes across the network according
to the pre-acquired Probe-Scheme. The Probe traffic is
added to the network’s normal chaotic traffic. As the
Probes are re-sent once every Tprs during the entire
training phase, they incur the traffic from which the
Agents collect raw statistics. When an Agent receives
a Probe, it extracts three raw features; hop count, travel
time, and num lost probes and delivers them to the
Sensor to which it is attached. The Sensor aggregates
the received statistics until, once per Tcl (Tcl >> Tprs),
it computes the average and the variance of the data
accumulated for the first two raw features, computes
the lost probes percentage, and constructs an instance.
The instance is then added to the Sensor’s private
training-set. Next, the statistics at the Sensors are
nullified and the process repeats until the end of the
training phase, by which time all the training-sets
contain the same number of instances. Table 1 presents
the Sensors’ training-set structure.
Next ,when the Sensors’ training-sets generation is
done, the Sensors’ classifiers are trained, each on its
own private training-set. Lastly , ACTIDS uses the
TUPSO ensemble scheme [12] to train the CDS’s clas-
sifier, which is responsible for combining the Sensors’
local anomaly score during the prediction phase.
Let Pmt =< pmt,1, ..., pmt,n > denote the vector contain-
ing the Sensors’ predictions, pm1 , ..., pmn for time unit t,
where n is the number of Sensors. TUPSO generates
a special train-set for the CDS’s combiner classifier by
applying k dedicated aggregate functions (described
in [12]), f(·), to Pm. Each such aggregation represents
a single feature (i.e., column) in the combiner’s train-
set. Table 2 illustrates the general structure of the
Probe: R8 −→ R2 ...
Time
Unit
Avg.
Delay
Var.
Delay
Avg. Hop
Count
Var. Hop
Count
% Lost
Probes
...............
1 a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 a1,4 a1,5 ...............
2 a2,1 a2,2 a2,3 a2,4 a2,5 ...............
... ... ... ... ... ... ...............
TABLE 1
The Sensor’s training-set structure. at,i denotes the
value of feature i at time unit t
7Time Unit f1 (Pmt ) f2 (P
m
t ) f3 (P
m
t ) ... f6 (P
m
t ) f7 (P
m
t )
1 ma1,1 ma1,2 ma1,3 ... ma1,6 ma1,7
2 ma2,1 ma2,2 ma2,3 ... ma2,6 ma2,7
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
TABLE 2
The training-set structure of the CDS’s combiner
CDS’s training-set. mat,i denotes the value of feature
i at time unit t.
3.4 Prediction Phase
The prediction phase represents the on-line state of
the proposed NIDS. To generate the special traffic
required by the proposed NIDS, the Agents contin-
uously send Probes once every Tprs, according to
the Probe-Scheme. Upon receiving the Probes, the
Agents extract the same raw features as they did in
the training phase. Each Agent adds the features it
has extracted to the attached Sensor, where they are
accumulated. Once every Tcl, each Sensor averages
the accumulated values and generates a local instance.
These instances are then classified by the Sensors’
classifiers and their statistics are reset. Lastly, the
predictions are combined by TUPSO, which outputs
the ensemble prediction for time t, denoted as EPt.
3.4.1 NIDS Output
The NIDS’s ensemble output for time t, EPt, is
capable of classifying a snapshot of the network’s
behavior as it reflects the combined anomaly scores
of the local Sensors. However, in situations where
the NIDS Sensors are very sensitive, they may incur
an erratic global prediction and thus induce false
alarms (i.e., normal network behavior mistakenly clas-
sified as anomalous). To refine its classification quality,
the presented NIDS uses the exponentially weighted
moving average technique (EWMA) which produces
smoother and conservative anomaly scores and, as a
result reduces, the potential for false alarms. This, as
we show in Section 5, is one of the factors respon-
sible for incurring extremely low false-positive rates
while at the same time allowing for a high detection
rate. In a nutshell, the EWMA technique accumulates
anomalous behavior evidence over time and, where
there is sufficient evidence, will output an anomaly
classification. The NIDS output, NAS ∈ [0, 1], is
computed as follows:
NASt = NASt−1 + ξ ∗∆(t, p)
where ∆(t, p) is the difference between the weighted
average of two time-series of the same length, p/2. The
first series begins at t− p and the second at t− p/2:
∆(t, p) =
∑ p
2−1
i=0 (
1
p
2−i ∗ (EPt− p2+i − EPt−p+i))∑ p
2
i=1 (
1
i )
Variable t is a discrete time point with granularity
tcl, and p is the sum length of the time-series taken
into consideration; ξ ∈ R>0 is the amplitude assigned
to changes in the network behavior; NASt represents
the likelihood of a network-wide anomaly in time t.
3.4.2 Localization Strategy
Identifying the location of an attack’s effect is a task
that the network operator has to deal with often.
Finding the anomaly location can be highly valuable,
particularly while the attack is on-going; this allows
for measures which can be deployed to mitigate the
attack. Identifying an attacks effect is also important
in the post-attack period, as it may provide the foren-
sic expert with helpful facts regarding the attacker’s
sources, such as attack propagation. In this section we
explain how ACTIDS makes use of the hierarchical
structure in order to pinpoint the location of attack’s
effect.
To identify the anomaly location, ACTIDS relies
heavily on the independent ability of each Sensor
to indicate the existence of a local anomaly. Once
a Sensor detects anomalous behavior, it sends the
CDS a computed (local) anomaly score along with a
list of network components in the region of which
it suspects has anomalous behavior. This list is pro-
duced by extracting the network components affecting
the anomalous features. Next, the CDS processes the
lists and produces a shortlist of suspected anomalous
components.
Figure 3 exemplifies this for the case of R14 at-
tacking R13. Assuming that, because of this attack,
the values of three Probe features become anomalous:
R4 → R20, R6 → R13 and R28 → R13. This causes
Sensors 2, 12, and 14 detect an anomaly. Each of
these three Sensors will therefore compile a list of
routers that have affected the Probes’ values, i.e.,
the routers that exist in the path of the anomalous
Probes. In our example, the reported lists contain: {R4,
R13, R20}, {R28, R19, R13}, and {R6, R21, R13} from
Sensors S2, S12, and S14, respectively. Next, to find
the anomalous network component(s), the CDS fuses
these lists using a very simple rule: Let the maximal
appearance of the network component be denoted
as maxApp. It declares any network component in
the reported lists that appears more than maxApp/2
as anomalous. In this example, R13 appears three
times, while the remaining routers appear only once;
therefore, only R13 is declared as anomalous. The
above process is executed for every test instance; thus,
on every classification, ACTIDS produces a list of
network components suspected of being anomalous.
The accuracy of this method depends on four factors:
the number of Sensors, the length of the Probes,
the anomaly detection accuracy of the Sensors, and
lastly, the ability of the Sensor to discriminate between
anomalous and normal features. Both the Sensors’
size limit and the Probes’ length were taken into
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Fig. 3. Sensor scheme deployed on top of AS4755
network topology. In this example R13 is under attack.
This attack incurs a network-wide anomaly detected in
remote Sensors, such as S5 and S9
consideration in the design of ACTIDS, hence the
limit of routers per Sensor and Probe-Path length were
considered as well.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we specify the conditions in which the
proposed NIDS was investigated. First, we illustrate
the network simulation used for executing the NIDS.
Then, we describe the machine-learning algorithms
that participated in the evaluation. Lastly, we present
the performance metrics needed to measure the effec-
tiveness of the NIDS.
The NIDS’s machine-learning modules were imple-
mented within the WEKA machine-learning frame-
work [4]. To evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed NIDS, we used the OMNeT++ [30] simulation
framework, which allows a network to be simulated
with full IP stacks. We used real router-level ISP
topologies, as mapped by the RocketFuel project [31].
Table 3 lists the ISP topologies used, which include
between ten and several hundred routers. The traffic
between the routers was generated based on the well-
known gravity model [32]. In this model each router
is randomly given a weight, and the average traffic
volume between two routers is proportional to the
product of their weights. The actual pattern of the
generated traffic was based on the self-similar model,
which is widely believed to be the model that best fits
Internet traffic [33].
The simulation was executed for 4500 time units
(TU ); the simulation was run for 1020 TU before the
NIDS was executed to ensure the OSPF converged,
then it began to send probes at a rate of 25 per
TU for the duration of the experiment, which was
set to 3500 TU . The classification period, tcl, was
defined as 1 TU so that overall, the datasets (training-
Topology Name Routers Links
AS1755 Ebone (Europe) 163 300
AS3257 Tiscali (Europe) 276 400
AS3356 Level3 (U.S.) 624 5,300
AS4755 VSNL (India) 11 12
TABLE 3
Properties of the autonomous systems used in the
evaluation. Source: RocketFuel
and test-sets) contained 3480 instances. Since the
Sensors contained differing numbers of data sources
(i.e., number of Probes), their datasets varied by the
number of features. Throughout the evaluation, we
used max routers = 4 and probesLength = 4 and a
classification threshold Θ = 0.75 over NAS, which
was sufficiently high so as to produce zero false
positives while maximizing the true-positive rate.
4.1 Attack Scenarios
In general, there are two ways for an attacker to harm
the QoS of a network. The first way is to change
the routes the normal production traffic takes. This
way, the attacker may direct traffic through a narrow
link or lengthen its route in order to increase the
delay and the packet-loss the traffic experiences. The
second way to harm the QoS of a network is to induce
extra production traffic that would normally not have
been generated. One example of this is a reflected
SYN attack in which the attacker sends many spoofed
SYN packets to various end hosts who respond with
SYN-ACK packets. In this example, the extra traffic is
induced by the attacker itself (SYN packets), as well as
the victim end hosts (SYN-ACK packets). By inducing
a high volume of traffic an attacker may exhaust the
bandwidth of one or more links in the network.
We evaluated our NIDS only against attack scenar-
ios of the first type, as it is considered more subtle
and harder to detect. There are various ways for an
attacker to implement such attacks. For example, he
may advertise false routing advertisements in order
to change the routing tables, he may poison a DNS
cache in order to change the destination IP address of
the traffic; or he may launch any application-specific
impersonation attack in order to divert traffic to a
false end host. From the network’s point of view, and
consequently from our NIDS’s point of view, all such
attacks have a similar effect, namely, traffic diversion.
To evaluate our NIDS’s effectiveness against traffic
diversion attacks we executed two OPSF attacks, i.e.,
partially disconnecting and link-weight distortion at-
tacks, and two DNS attack variants, i.e., DNS cache
poisoning and authoritative DNS server poisoning
(shown in Figure 4). The description of these four
attack variants is given in [34]. These attacks are cur-
rently the most flexible and powerful way to achieve
traffic diversion. Please note that ACTIDS is not a
protocol-specific solution, i.e., it is not limited to the
abovementioned protocols.
9R6 R4
R2
Authoritative
DNS Server
What is the IP of R4 ?
1.2.3.4
Poison R4 DNS entry
R5
R8 (IP: 1.2.3.4)
R3
R7 
Fig. 4. An example of the authoritative DNS server
poisoning attack, in which the affect of a single poi-
soned Authoritative DNS server entry is illustrated. The
blue lines indicate the optimal routes, and the red lines
indicate the routes that the packet would take due to
the attack
4.2 Datasets
In each experiment related to the above mentioned
attack scenarios, two datasets were generated: one
training-set and one evaluation set. The training-
set contained instances related to normal network
behavior only, whereas the evaluation set contained
instances related to normal and attacked periods
(33.3% labeled “normal” and the remaining 66.67%
labeled “attack”).
4.3 Classifiers
For evaluation purposes, we made use of three one-
class algorithms: OC-PGA [35], 1-SVM [36], and AD-
IFA (Attribute DIstribution Function Approximation)
[37]. We selected these base-classifiers because they
represent the prominent families of one-class clas-
sifiers: density (OC-PGA) and boundary (OC-SVM).
The OC-PGA algorithm is an adaptation for one-class
learning from a well-known unsupervised algorithm
[38] and the ADIFA algorithm is a univariate one-
class anomaly detection algorithm based on meta-
learning. In training the meta-classifier (the classifier
of the global anomaly detector), we made use of
ADIFA because it performed considerably better than
the other learning algorithms.
4.4 Performance Metrics
In evaluating the NIDS, the following performance
metrics were used: classification error rate, F-Score,
area under the ROC curve (AUC), and Time-to-Detect
and anomaly-localization score. These performance
metrics provide sufficient information to assess the
fitness of the proposed NIDS for detecting network
anomalies originated by network attacks. Figure 5
depicts a network attack that begins at “attack start”
time and ends after twelve Tcl time-units. Also shown
is the corresponding predicted attack score produced
by the NIDS (i.e., NAS).
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Fig. 5. A network attack surface and the corresponding
predicted global network anomaly score over time
The classification error rate is the rate of incorrect
predictions made by a classifier and is computed by
the equation error = (fp + fn)/(tp + tn + fp + fn),
where tp, tn, fp and fn denote the number of true
positive, true negative, false positive and false nega-
tive classifications of network behavior, respectively.
The F-Score is a performance measure used in many
research domains such as data mining and informa-
tion retrieval. It is defined by F -Score = 2pr/(p + r),
where p and r are classification precision and recall,
respectively. To obtain a high score, both precision and
recall must be high. Time-to-Detect (TtD) is a temporal
metric that measures the time (in time-units, TU) from
the commencement of a network attack to detection
by the classifier (the NIDS). Usually there is a trade-
off between TtD and false-positive rate (FPR). A low
TtD (a good measure) typically comes at the price
of a greater FPR, since the classifier is less able to
distinguish between noise signals, which are erratic,
and attack signals, which tend to be more stable.
The Aread under the ROC curve (AUC) measures
the effectiveness of the classifier. The ROC curve
is a graph produced by plotting the true positive
rate TPR (a.k.a recall) versus the false positive rate
(TPR = tp/(tp+ fn), FPR = fp/(fp+ tn)). The AUC
value of the best possible classifier will be equal to
unity. This would imply that it is possible to configure
the classifier so that it will have 0% false positive and
100% true positive classifications. The worst possi-
ble binary classifier (obtained by flipping a coin for
example) has AUC of 0.5. AUC is considered as an
objective performance metric as it does not depend
on the specific discrimination threshold used by the
classifier.
Lastly, the anomaly-localization score (AL-Score) is
an estimator that measures the extent to which the
NIDS correctly identifies the source location of the
anomaly. This measure is applicable for systems that
can output a list of network components suspected of
behaving anomalously. AL-Score is given by:
ALScore = 1−
∑|Anpredicted|
i=1 D(An
i
predicted, Anreal)∑|v|
i=1D(vi, Anreal)
where D(vi, U) computes the shortest path from node
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vi to the closest among nodes U ; Anipredicted is the
ith router in the group of routers predicted to be
anomalous; and Anreal is the group of victim routers.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we present the empirical results,
obtained by the proposed NIDS in the four of the
above mentioned attack scenarios.
5.1 Probes Traffic Volume
The probes are the most important tool the proposed
NIDS uses for identifying network anomalies. Un-
fortunately, they inevitably add some traffic to the
network. By doing so, they might affect the NIDS
measurements, or even, if a significant volume of
probe traffic is produced, can reduce the network
QoS. Therefore, it is imperative to quantify the probes’
effect on the network. Fortunately, since the probes
dispatching scheme, probes packet size, and the re-
sending frequency remain constant during the entire
on-line phase, computing the augmented network
traffic volume is straightforward.
Table 4 summarizes the properties of the NIDS
probes for the used network topologies. For calculat-
ing the probes traffic the following were assumed. A
probe packet size is exactly 64 bytes, each probe is
sent 25 times per second, and the bandwidth of every
network link is 100Mb/s. The results indicate that the
probes traffic volume is insignificant in terms of its
capability to harm the network QoS.
#Probes Probe Traffic
Topology (Probes/Sec) (Bytes/Sec) % of network’s bandwidth
1755 125 8,000 0.004%
3257 75 4,800 0.005%
3356 1,375 88,000 0.007%
4755 350 22,400 0.006%
TABLE 4
Properties of the Probes traffic
5.2 Comparison with Passive Features
A basic assumption made in this study is that Probes’
traffic features can yield a superior predictive model
compared to passive-oriented feature sources. In this
experiment we compared the Probes’ features with
two passive traffic features sources, i.e., link-based
features and router-based features, with the inten-
tion of determining whether the primary assump-
tion holds. In addition, we tested whether a mix-
ture of feature sources can improve the NIDS clas-
sifiers’ performance. As link-based features, #bytes/sec
and #packet/sec features were extracted for each link,
and as router-based features, three management-
information-base (MIB) features were extracted for
each router: #packets forwarded, #local deliveries and
#unroutable packets.
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Fig. 6. Comparison between “passive” network fea-
tures and “active” (probe) features
The NIDS was evaluated with both the partially
disconnecting and the DNS cache poisoning attacks
on the AS3356 and AS4755 network topology, respec-
tively. We used only the ADIFA algorithm for training
the Sensor classifiers.
Figure 6 presents a stacked plot of four aggregate
features (each data-point is an average of 25 raw
values), extracted by the proposed NIDS during a sim-
ulation run, in which a DNS cache poisoning attack
was executed after 925 seconds. The upper most graph
shows the #packets forwarded feature, as measured in
router R28, the second graph from the top shows
the #packets forwarded feature of the R13 ↔ R19 link,
the third graph shows the R28 → R13 probe’s round
trip average travel time, and the graph at the bottom
shows the variance of the travel time of the same probe.
The data was captured at a simulation run, where a
DNS cache poisoning attack was executed using the
AS4755 topology. The gray graphs represent the raw
data, the black bold graphs are the trend lines (using
the moving average), and the red lines plot the three
standard deviations range, computed from the raw
value, over a historical time period of 60 seconds.
The graphs in Figure 6 lead to two conclusions.
First, prior to the attack, both the MIB and Link
features are much less stable compared to the two
probe features. Second, the mean and variance of the
probes raw data are much more affected by the attack,
compared to both the MIB and Link raw features;
while the average and variance of the raw MIB values
increased due to the attack by 27% and 40% respec-
tively, the average and variance of the probe’s raw
data (travel time variance) were increased by 426%
and 1,680% respectively.
Continuing the comparison between the active and
passive features, the next logical step is to study
the classification performance of the proposed NIDS
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FPR
R78 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R79 0.000 0.096 0.153 0.086 0.143 0.146 0.138
R20 0.000 0.118 0.124 0.103 0.135 0.126 0.153
R69 0.000 0.167 0.205 0.156 0.185 0.224 0.223
R76 0.000 0.175 0.141 0.060 0.132 0.150 0.146
Total 0.000 0.111 0.124 0.081 0.119 0.129 0.132
TPR
R78 0.990 0.968 0.722 0.988 0.989 0.901 0.988
R79 0.989 0.664 0.989 0.989 0.988 0.988 0.986
R20 0.885 0.998 0.990 0.994 0.990 0.990 0.990
R69 0.329 0.787 0.342 0.723 0.346 0.606 0.591
R76 0.989 0.993 0.990 0.991 0.990 0.988 0.989
Total 0.836 0.882 0.806 0.937 0.861 0.894 0.909
TABLE 5
A comparison between ACTIDS features sources,
based on TPR and FPR metrics
when using the different feature-set combinations. To
this end, four scenarios of the partially-disconnecting
attack were executed on the AS3356 topology, of
which description is given in Table 6.
The results in Table 5 show that when trained
using probe-based features, ACTIDS performed better
compared to when trained on link-based or MIB-
based features. A zero FPR was achieved only by
using the probe-based features, while the other feature
sources produced a considerably higher FPR.
In order to expand the generality of the above
results, we plot ROC graphs by measuring the clas-
sification TPR and FPR of the proposed NIDS, for a
range of classification thresholds. Figure 7 contains
ROC graphs for the DNS cache poisoning attack,
and Figure 8 contains ROC plots for the partially-
disconnecting attack.
These ROC plots show that only the probe-feature
group was able to produce a significant TPR (0.85
and 0.86 for the partially disconnecting and the DNS
cache poisoning attacks, respectively) while, at the
same time, inflicting no false positives at all.
These results are highly significant because they
suggest that probe-based NIDS can successfully de-
tect zero-day attacks, without needing to monitor the
attack’s traffic or the attack objective, such as the OSPF
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Fig. 7. ROC graphs for the DNS cache poisoning
attack over the AS4755 topology
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Fig. 8. ROC graphs for the partially-disconnecting
attack over the AS3566 topology
routing table or the DNS cache. Interestingly, in both
attack classes, the combination of probe features with
either link or MIB features resulted with an inferior
classification model, as long as zero FPR was required.
The following examines some additional aspects of
the proposed NIDS. This examination is arranged in
four sections, each of which deals with a different
attack class.
5.3 Detecting Partially Disconnecting Attacks
In this experiment, ACTIDS is evaluated on attacks
that logically disconnect half the victim(s) interfaces
so that traffic can still pass or be routed through
them on some interfaces. Hence the victim(s) are only
partially “disconnected”. This experiment has two
goals: first, to study the ability of the presented NIDS
to detect network-based attacks with global effects;
second, to determine which machine-learning algo-
rithm is best suited for detecting the abovementioned
attacks. Table 6 summarizes the attack scenarios and
the attributes of their corresponding datasets.
Attack Scenarios ACTIDS datasets
Topology Attacker → Victim Sensors Features Avg.
AS3257 R1→ R3, R1→ R6 4 12.5
AS1755 R2→ R11, R4→ R13, R9→ R15 4 22.5
AS4755 R14→ R13, R2→ R11, R2→ R16 15 12.06
AS3356 R75→ R78, R75→ R79 54 10.1R77→ R20, R8→ R76
TABLE 6
Partially Disconnecting attack scenarios
The results in Table 7 show that ADIFA algorithm
achieve a detection rate greater than 98% and that all
three algorithms had no false-positive classifications:
Their only classification errors were made during
the attack period (false negative) when the NIDS
was waiting to obtain “sufficient” global anomaly
evidence.
Comparison of the two presented output functions
reveals that EP (ensemble prediction output) is the
most responsive measure for detecting attacks; how-
ever, it comes at the price of a higher FPR. In contrast,
NAS has longer TtD than EP , but generates fewer
12
AS Algorithm TPR FPR % Error F-Score TtD AL-Score
3257
1-SVM 0.981 0.000 0.014 0.990 49.000 0.946
OC-PGA 0.980 0.000 0.014 0.990 50.500 0.945
ADIFA 0.982 0.000 0.013 0.991 46.500 0.942
1755
1-SVM 0.981 0.000 0.014 0.990 49.000 0.951
OC-PGA 0.980 0.000 0.014 0.990 51.000 0.950
ADIFA 0.982 0.000 0.013 0.991 46.333 0.971
4755
1-SVM 0.981 0.000 0.014 0.990 49.000 0.982
OC-PGA 0.681 0.000 0.229 0.710 49.667 0.980
ADIFA 0.982 0.000 0.013 0.991 46.333 0.993
3356
1-SVM 0.981 0.000 0.014 0.990 48.667 0.988
OC-PGA 0.793 0.000 0.149 0.856 48.333 0.986
ADIFA 0.982 0.000 0.013 0.991 47.000 0.998
Total
1-SVM 0.981 0.000 0.014 0.990 48.909 0.969
OC-PGE 0.847 0.000 0.110 0.877 49.818 0.967
ADIFA 0.982 0.000 0.013 0.991 46.474 0.976
Total EP 0.878 0.007 0.090 0.886 28.810 0.970
NAS 0.934 0.000 0.047 0.951 48.492
TABLE 7
Result table for the partially disconnecting attack class
false-positive classifications, which is usually a more
important property for real NIDS.
5.4 Detecting Link Weight Distortion Attacks
Continuing further with the experimentation, we eval-
uate the proposed NIDS on the ‘Link Weight Distor-
tion’ attack over three different scenarios. In the first
two scenarios a single link weight is affected, whereas
in the third, two links are simultaneously affected.
Specifically, the implemented attack increased the tar-
get link’s weight (cost) by one orders of magnitude,
to insure a global anomaly. The experiment was per-
formed on the largest network topology, i.e., AS3356.
Affected Link Algorithm TPR FPR %Error F-Score TtD AL-Score
R50↔ R79
1-SVM 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.0 n/a n/a
OC-PGA 0.913 0.000 0.062 0.955 33.0 0.984
ADIFA 0.985 0.000 0.011 0.992 18.0 0.993
R79↔ R80
1-SVM 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.0 n/a n/a
OC-PGA 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.0 n/a n/a
ADIFA 0.468 0.000 0.379 0.637 136.0 0.994
R50↔ R79
R79↔ R80
1-SVM 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.0 n/a n/a
OC-PGA 0.990 0.000 0.667 0.995 25.0 0.984
ADIFA 0.995 0.000 0.003 0.998 13.0 0.993
TABLE 8
Result table for the Link-Weight Distortion attack class
The results in Table 8 show that the Link Weight
Distortion attack was, in general, harder to detect,
when compared to the partially disconnecting attack.
Consequently, when the proposed NIDS used the OC-
PGA classifier, it did not detect one of the three
attacks, and with the 1-SVM classifier it missed the
attacks of all three scenarios. In contrast, when it used
the ADIFA classifiers it detected all the attacks, and
presented the best classification performance among
the examined classifiers, with the shortest time-to-
detect and the highest true positive detection rate.
5.5 Detecting DNS Cache Poisoning Attack
In this section we study the detection performance
of the proposed NIDS on a simulated effect of the
DNS cache poisoning. Specifically, we examine the
NIDS sensitivity using an increasing attack inten-
sity, implemented by a series of experiments, each
simulates an increased percentage of DNS poisoned
entries at the victim routers. Five DNSs (routers)
were subjected attacked during the experiment series
to insure a substantial effect on the network’s QoS,
even when only 10 percents of the DNS cache entries
are poisoned. The experiment series was performed
using the AS4755 topology. Router R28 was used as
the adversary, whereas the victims role was given to
routers R1, R2, R3, R8, and R9.
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Fig. 9. AUC results for the proposed NIDS over differ-
ent DNS cache poisoning percentage
The results in Figure 9 indicates that when the cache
poisoning attack intensity was below 40 percent, non
of the feature sets provided sufficient and robust in-
formation for intrusion detection. A change of trends
started from an intensity around 40 to 50 percent.
From this point and on, the Probe features incurred a
detection AUC rate of above 0.95, which was greater
than that of both the Link and MIB feature sets. It
is important to note that until the attack reached
the critical value of around 40 percents, the network
QoS remained unharmed, as no evidence of increased
delays, jitter or packet loss could be observed, either
automatically or manually, from the extracted raw
network data.
5.6 Detecting Authoritative DNS Server Poisoning
Attacks
The current experiment studies the robustness of the
proposed NIDS in detecting the authoritative DNS
server poisoning attack. Unlike the DNS cache poison-
ing attack, every endpoint computer is subjected to
the effect of the attack. Therefore, in order to generate
a moderate, yet significant attack effect, only a single
DNS entry was poisoned, so that only a small fraction
of the global network traffic would be affected. In
order to control the attack’s intensity, we limited the
number of endpoints computers in the local network
behind the victim router that are subjected to the
attack. For example, if the local network contains 10
endpoint computers, and the attack intensity is 20 per-
cents, only the traffic directed to a selected 2 endpoint-
computers behind the victim router will be redirected
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to the adversary. The experiment was conducted using
the AS3257 topology, of which results are presented
in Figure 10.
The results show that the QoS of the network
had deteriorated, even when only 20 percents of the
endpoint computers behind the victim router were
affected. The greatest efficiency in the intrusion detec-
tion task was achieved by using the Probe features. In
contrast, the Link features provided the least useful
information among the three available feature sets.
The MIB features provided a detection performance,
similar to that achieved by the Probe features, only
when the attack intensity was greater than 80 per-
cents.
5.7 Handling Byzantine Faults
Byzantine Faults are benign network events in which
some network elements perform significantly differ-
ently to that described by their nominal definition
due to common reasons such as failed links, routers,
switches or other network hardware. Naturally, these
types of devices are monitored by the network service
provider’s dedicated control channels, and therefore,
detecting such events is not the focus of the present
work. However, because these benign events might
incur false detections for ACTIDS, we would like
to study its ability to discriminate benign anomalies
from anomalies that are the result of malicious activ-
ity.
The next experiment examines the extent to which
ACTIDS detects benign anomalies and how it is
trained to ignore such anomalies. To simulate benign
routing anomalies, we incurred some link-failures
during the simulation execution. To make the benign
anomalies more interesting, the link-failures were
designed to disconnect some critical links, i.e, non-
redundant links between central routers, so that when
executed the network would be strongly affected.
Two links were chosen: R76 ↔ R80 and R51 ↔
R80. The links were disconnected at simulation time
TUstart=182, 2626, and then were returned to full
connectivity at TUend=1980 and 3480 respectively.
In this experiment, performed over the AS3356 net-
work, the NIDS’ classifiers were trained by the ADIFA
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Fig. 10. AUC results for the proposed NIDS over
different DNS cache poisoning percentage
algorithm on three sets of features: Probes (denoted
P ), Links (denoted L) and Probes + Links (denoted
PL). Tr denotes a training-set containing normal
network behavior instances, Tr+ denotes training-
sets that contain both normal and benign anomaly
instances, and valid.set represents a validation set
incorporating both normal instances and attack (par-
tially disconnecting) instances.
Training Validation Feature FPR TPR FNR TtD
EP NAS EP NAS EP NAS
Tr Tr+
P 0.02 0 − − − − −
L 0.26 0.19 − − − − −
PL 0.72 0.67 − − − − −
Tr+ Tr+
P 0.01 0 − − − − −
L 0.22 0.11 − − − − −
PL 0.09 0.07 − − − − −
Tr+ valid.set
P 0.02 0 1 0.99 0.00 0.01 28.5
L 0.06 0 0.64 0.57 0.34 0.43 291.6
PL 0.06 0 1 0.99 0.00 0.01 25.3
TABLE 9
The effect of Byzantine Faults on the NIDS
classification performance
Table 9 shows that benign anomalies can indeed
be falsely identified as network attacks and that the
choice of training features has a large impact on the
false detection rate. When trained with Probes features,
ACTIDS had a 2% false detection rate; however, when
trained with Link features, it had an imposing 26%
false detection rate.
Continuing with the experiment, we explored how
to mitigate the false detection. We believe that, by
modeling benign anomalies as part of the normal
state, ACTIDS will learn to ignore similar benign
anomalies. For this reason, ACTIDS was trained upon
both normal instances and link-failure instances. To
evaluate the effect of these new conditions, ACTIDS
was evaluated on normal and attack instances. The
results are presented in the final three rows of Table
9. It appears that, in these new conditions, ACTIDS
made much fewer detection errors, regardless of the
feature-set used. Surprisingly, the results indicate that
modeling benign anomalies, instead of rendering the
NIDS less susceptible to any type of anomaly, did not
harm the performance in any measurable way; the
recall remained higher than 0.98 while maintaining a
zero FPR and the TtD was not prolonged as expected.
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a new active strategy
for NIDS called ACTIDS. It detects and localizes net-
work attacks by means of self-produced short-range
probes, hierarchical anomaly detection and one-class
ensemble learning.
We examined the proposed NIDS on 4 network
topologies over 35 attack scenarios. The smallest
network contained 9 routers, whereas the largest
contained 82 routers. The experiments spanned five
dimensions: attack class, features groups, topology,
learning algorithm, and the NIDS output function.
Our results show that the active approach can perform
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better than the passive approach in detecting attacks
that harm the QoS of the network. Experimented
on the same platform, the active Probes features
produced a considerably better classification perfor-
mance, compared to the passive features. In particular,
the Probe features incurred a zero false-detection rate
(FPR), while achieving a true-detection rate (recall)
of 85%. In order to produce such a high recall value,
the NIDS, when trained on passive-related features,
suffered from more than 10% false-detection classifi-
cations.
Another strength of the proposed NIDS is with its
anomaly-localizing technique, which has been shown
to be highly accurate and therefore, can serve as
a powerful forensic tool for network operators and
security experts.
The time taken for ACTIDS to detect a network
attack was, on average, 46.8 seconds. This is an ex-
cellent result bearing in mind the zero-false-positives
constraint and that network attacks, within the scope
of this paper, are expected to last longer than an order
of minutes.
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